International technology transfer and development of capabilities in Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises:lessons from 20 years of case research by Vaidya, Kirit et al.
  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITIES IN 
CHINESE STATE-OWNED MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES: 
LESSONS FROM 20 YEARS OF CASE RESEARCH 
 
Kirit G. Vaidya  Matthew J. Hall 
Aston Business School  Aston Business School 
Aston University   Aston University  
Aston Triangle  Aston Triangle 
Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK  Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK 
k.g.vaidya@aston.ac.uk   m.j.hall@aston.ac.uk  
   
He Jinsheng Xudong Gao David J. Bennett,  
College of Management and 
Economics 
Department of Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship 
Chalmers University of 
Technology 
Tianjin University Tsinghua University Gothenburg, Sweden 
Tianjin, China Beijing, China david.bennett@chalmers.se   
jshe@tju.edu.cn gaoxudong@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn   
 
ABSTRACT 
Technological capabilities in Chinese manufacturing have been transformed in the last three decades. 
However, the extent to which domestic market oriented state owned enterprises (SOEs) have developed 
their capabilities is not clear. Six SOEs in the automotive, steel and machine tools sectors in Beijing and 
Tianjin have been studied since the mid-1990s to assess the capability levels attained and the role of 
external sources and internal efforts in developing them. Aided by government policies, acquisition of 
technology and their own efforts, the case study companies appear to be broadly following the East Asian 
late industrialisation model. All six enterprises demonstrate competences in operating established 
technology, managing investment and making product and process improvements. The evidence suggests 
that companies without foreign joint venture (JV) collaborations have made more progress in this respect. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With a share of world manufacturing output at almost 19 per cent in 2010, China inched ahead of the USA 
to become the world’s largest producer of manufactured goods (calculated from UN Statistics Division 
(undated) data). The manufacturing sector in China employs about 10 times as many people as in the USA 
to produce a similar level of output. This difference can partly be explained by the concentration of 
labour-intensive production in China. Nevertheless, given the substantial progress China has made in 
export performance (Vaidya et al, 2007) and in meeting the growing domestic demand, questions remain 
on the extent to which Chinese manufacturing is continuing to rely on low labour costs or developing 
more advanced technological capabilities. 
An important question is whether China is following patterns of technological catch-up identified by 
Matthews (2001) in other East Asian countries, notably Korea and Taiwan, which started from 
manufacturing competence acquired from low-tech labour intensive sub-contracting. While export-
oriented sectors in China have followed this pattern (Lall and Albaladejo, 2004), the situation is more 
complex because of the diversity of manufacturing, the importance of the domestic market and the large 
number of SOEs. Following the initiation of the Open Door policy, China encouraged acquisition of 
foreign technology and know-how by SOEs through a range of channels. As Matthews (2001; 2006) and 
Kim (1997) show, developing internationally comparable capabilities requires progressing beyond reliance 
on imported technology to deepen firm level capabilities through learning and R&D (Bennett and Vaidya, 
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2005). Matthews (2006) highlights the importance of the three Ls, leverage, linkage and learning, in 
developing capabilities by latecomers. 
While the development of advanced capabilities is evident in Chinese companies such as Konka, 
TCL, Haier, Huawei and Lenovo in dynamic high-tech sectors, it is the manufacturing SOEs in mature 
markets which face greater challenges in becoming competitive. The focus of this paper is therefore on 
how and to what extent domestic market oriented SOEs have developed their technological capabilities. 
 
2 THE STUDY APPROACH AND ISSUES INVESTIGATED  
Having studied the nature, motivations and value of international technology transfer to Chinese 
enterprises in the 1990s, we take a longitudinal case study approach to track six manufacturing SOEs since 
the mid-1990s to assess changes in their technological capabilities, the role in the changes of external 
sources and internal efforts and of policies. The case study enterprises are located in Beijing and Tianjin, 
two in the automotive sector (Beijing Benz Automotive Co Ltd, a JV subsidiary of Beijing Automotive 
Industries Holding Co (BAIC) and Tianjin FAW Xiali Automobile Co Ltd), two in the steel sector 
(Shougang Group Corporation and Tianjin Pipe Corporation (TPCO)), and two in the machine tools sector 
(BYJC Machine Tool Co Ltd in Beijing and Tianjin Tianduan Press Company Ltd).  
In our initial studies in the 1990s, the focus was on the role of international technology transfer. Since 
2000 it has shifted towards understanding the process of capability development. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with representatives of the six companies in 2006 and 2012. Contextual 
questions about changes in governance, major products and markets, sales, profitability and number of 
employees were followed by questions about technological capability (e.g. extent and nature of R&D and 
the number of patents taken out by the company). Company representatives were then asked to identify 
the most important technologies the company had developed independently and acquired from external 
sources. Information was also sought on the levels of the technologies developed and used by enterprises 
(i.e. whether they offered a lead over international or Chinese competitors, were comparable or less 
advanced). 
 
 Capability stages: Competence based on knowledge and skills 
Stage 1 Manufacturing competence (production including shop floor experience and learning by doing). 
Stage 2 Investment competence (installing new production capacity, expansion or modernisation of capacity).  
Stage 3 Adapting and stretching competence (engineering and organisational adaptations for continuous and 
incremental upgrading of products, performance features, and process technology). 
Stage 4 Innovation competence (product and process innovation and creation of new technology). 
 Levels of attainment 
Very High Comparable with international leading companies in the sector of specialisation. 
High Competence to perform independently with external input and support which the company has decided 
to buy from outside and which is effectively managed by the company. 
Medium Competence to perform but with substantial external input and support required because of gaps in the 
company know how. Significant impact on volume and quality without the support. 
Low Low competence to perform with many emerging problems. Still at the learning stage. Requires 
substantial external input and support without which it would fail. 
Table 1: Capability stages and levels of attainment 
 
In the case-study analysis we adopt the East Asian latecomer development model (Bennett and 
Vaidya, 2005) to comprise four stages with a sequential progression from Stages 1 to 4. For each case the 
level of capability attained in each of the stages was assessed. The stages and levels are set out in Table 1. 
An inductive approach has enabled us to investigate: (a) whether there is a sequential and progressive 
relationship between the stages, (b) whether relying on collaborative relationships (especially JVs) and 
developing internal capabilities are mutually exclusive, and (c) whether developing manufacturing 
excellence and innovative competence are compatible (Gao et al, 2007). 
 
3  CASE ANALYSIS 
Since the case study companies are in the automotive, steel and machine tools sectors, developments in 
these sectors and industrial policies influencing them are briefly described as context. All three sectors 
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have experienced rapid growth and China is the largest producer of cars, steel and machine tools. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the automotive and steel sectors became highly fragmented with many provinces 
promoting and supporting old and new enterprises. The machine tools sector did not see a similar 
proliferation of new enterprises but they ware locally protected. The “modern enterprise” reform process 
initiated in the 1990s reduced the SOEs’ social obligations and facilitated their transformation into more 
commercially oriented corporatised enterprises (Yi-min Lin and Tian Zhu, 2000). Alongside these reforms, 
central government started addressing the fragmentation of the key manufacturing sectors. In broad terms, 
the approach was to identify leading enterprises in each sector and support them in taking over smaller or 
weaker ones with a view to improving them or rationalising production (Nolan, 2001).  
Even when manufacturing output in these sectors was growing in the 1980s and 1990s, it was 
recognised that China as a latecomer lagged behind in manufacturing knowhow. Following the latecomer 
model, the broad approach was to learn from more advanced foreign knowhow and use it as a base to 
develop indigenous capabilities by engaging in product and process development and R&D. However, the 
specific approaches to learn from foreign knowhow differed between sectors. In the automotive sector, 
formation of JVs with foreign enterprises was the dominant mode. In the steel sector, the focus was on 
importing the most advanced production equipment, reverse engineering and R&D. In the machine tools 
sector, a wide range of modes of foreign technology acquisition, purchase of equipment, licensing, co-
production and JVs have been used, to be complemented by internal efforts.  
In the sectoral context outlined above, Tables 2 and 3 summarise the case study findings with Table 2 
outlining developments in governance, restructuring and production and Table 3 presenting the 
technological capability appraisal based on the framework introduced in section 2. All case study 
companies have been influenced by the “modern enterprise” reform referred to above. Tianjin Tianduan is 
the smallest case study enterprise and a subsidiary of a holding company, formerly a Tianjin Municipality 
line ministry. Tianjin FAW Xiali is also a subsidiary of a larger company but of one of the largest Chinese 
automotive groups formed under the restructuring of the automotive sector. BAIC (Chinese parent of 
Beijing Benz), BYJC and Shougang are large group enterprises. TPCO was created in 1989 by Tianjin 
municipal administration with central government support to produce pipes for the oil and gas sector to 
reduce import dependence. While TPCO has made rapid progress as a producer and in its technological 
capabilities (Table 3), it has needed very substantial financial support and restructuring to convert debt 
into shares owned by state asset holding companies. All enterprises have seen rapid growth in sales over 
the period (Table 2). However, only Shougang and TPCO, both steel companies have exports of any size. 
BYJC has overseas sales but from Waldrich Coburg, its German subsidiary acquired in 2005. 
All the case companies have attained Very High manufacturing competence (Table 3) implying either 
having attained internationally comparative competence or approaching it. Investment competence is also 
High or Very High in the companies as evidenced by the management of capacity expansion and location 
change implemented by the case companies. All the case companies stated that they acquired the most 
advanced equipment for their new plants. Shougang Group had the capacity to design and construct some 
of the plant while TPCO collaborated with a supplier of equipment in developing it. 
Stage 3 capability in Table 2 refers to adaptation as well as development of processes and products 
relying on known technology with limited innovation. This is a departure from Bennett and Vaidya (2005) 
which specify process and product adaptation as Stage 3. This modification is an outcome of the inductive 
case study approach during which it has been observed that all the companies have developed products 
based on a combination of acquired knowhow and internal learning and adaptation without engaging in a 
high level of innovation. We argue that the adaptive and development capabilities require manufacturing 
and investment competences which deepen understanding of production processes and product features.  
The stages approach implies that “Stage 4: Innovation” is sequentially dependent on the previous 
stages. Having acquired stages 1 to 3 capabilities, all companies recognise the need for R&D and have 
internal R&D complemented by links with research institutes or universities. We categorise Tianduan, 
Shougang and Tianjin Pipe in the High to Very High category because of the level of their R&D activity 
and the number of patents they have registered. They are not in the unequivocal Very High category 
because all three acknowledged that there were some vital technologies in which they lagged behind 
international leaders. With the acquisition of Waldrich Coburg, BYJC has the potential to attain High to 
Very High innovation competence but keeping the German subsidiary at arm’s length may impose 
constraints. Of the two auto companies, BAIC has a more ambitious R&D programme but the companies 
are not strictly comparable because Tianjin FAW Xiali is a subsidiary of a large group and innovative 
initiatives are likely to be at the group level. 
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Sector Company Background and governance Products, sales, exports and profits 
Auto Beijing Benz 
Automotive Co 
Ltd and BAIC  
A JV between Beijing Automotive Industries Holding Co (BAIC) 
and Daimler AG with the ownership split 50:50 (new agreement 
in 2004). Originally, the first Sino-foreign automotive JV (Beijing 
Jeep) between Beijing Automobile Works (now subsidiary of 
BAIC) and American Motors (later acquired by Chrysler 
Corporation). The Chrysler Daimler merger in 1998 gave Daimler 
entry into the JV. Chrysler exited the JV after the failure of 
Chrysler Daimler merger in 2007. 
Until 2005 JV production of American Motors/Chrysler SUVs (Jeep Cherokee, 
Grand Cherokee). Low production volume in 2005 (25,000 vehicles) because of 
high cost (including import duty) of imported components and concerns about 
military use of some technology. After 2004 investment and capacity expansion 
to assemble Mercedes Benz C and E Class and GLK. Future expansion to include 
an engine plant and R&D centre (both firsts out of Germany for Mercedes). 
Production increased from 26,000 in 2006 to 93,000 in 2011. Expected to be 
300,000 to 350,000 by 2015. JV’s profit in 2011 was RMB3.9b (billion).  
Tianjin FAW 
Xiali 
Automobile Co 
Ltd 
Formerly, Tianjin Micro-Car Factory which became Tianjin 
Automotive Industrial (Group) Co in 1997 and was listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1999. In 2002, it became a 
subsidiary of FAW (First Auto Works) Group, one of the largest 
five auto enterprises in China, as a part of restructuring of the 
automobile sector. A JV with Toyota started in 1999 and has now 
become part of collaboration between FAW and Toyota. 
Formerly Xiali produced cars based on the 1987 Daihatsu Charade which were 
very popular in China as taxicabs. Newer versions launched in the 1990s. A 
model based on Toyota Yaris introduced after 2000. There is a continuing 
programme of new small low priced cars aimed at the young and non-
metropolitan customers. Total production of 130,000 vehicles in 2005 was almost 
entirely for the Chinese market. Production in 2009 was 214,000. Sales and 
profit in 2009 were RMB8.57b and RMB 176m (million) respectively (both 
estimated to be higher in 2011). A new powertrain plant with a capacity of 
400,000 was completed in 2008. A new assembly plant opened in 2011 has 
increased production capacity to 400,000 with further expansion in progress.       
Machine 
tools 
BYJC Machine 
Tool Co Ltd 
Formerly Beijing No 1 Machine Tool Works. In the 1990s started 
transitioning from a traditional SOE to commercial orientation. 
Core enterprise in the restructured machine tool sector in Beijing. 
Since 2000, JVs with Japanese, Korean and French firms and 
acquisition of German co-production partner, Waldrich Coburg. 
Continues to manufacture milling, boring and drilling machines of various types 
including machining centres and super heavy machines. Works with customers to 
install production lines. Total sales value in 2005 was RMB1b (over 3 times that 
in 1997) and about RMB3.3b in 2011. Some of the increase may be because of 
acquisitions and restructuring.    
Tianjin 
Tianduan Press 
Co Ltd 
In the 1990s an enterprise under the Tianjin Ministry of 
Machinery Industry. By 2012, a restructured subsidiary of Tianjin 
BENEFO Machinery & Electric Holding Group Ltd - formerly 
the Tianjin Machinery Industry Bureau. Reportedly, company 
management shares in profits through 20% share ownership.   
The company is the largest producer of hydraulic presses in China (40% market 
share) and produces presses of varying capacities and meeting special 
requirements such as heavy presses and presses for aircraft panels and glass 
fibre. Sales revenue in 2005 was RMB260m with a profit of RMB2m. In 2010 
the respective figures were RMB676m and RMB18m. 
Steel Shougang 
Group 
Corporation 
In the mid-1990s, one of the largest Chinese steel manufacturers 
identified to be the core of a restructured national steel sector. 
Freedom to make investment decisions, vertically integrate 
backwards into mining and logistics and forward into trading. 
Now a conglomerate with complex cross-ownerships and a 
number of subsidiaries engaged in steel and non-steel sector 
activities. Number 295 in the Global Fortune 500.  
An integrated iron and steel enterprise involved in extraction and processing of 
iron ore, steel production and heavy equipment manufacture. In the 1990s, steel 
production was lower grade. In 2006, steel production was 12.5mt (million 
tonnes) (constrained by relocation of Beijing steel plant). In 2010-11, annual 
steel production increased to 30mt through the new coastal plant at Caofeidian 
coming on stream and acquisition of other steel producers as part of 
restructuring. Lower value added long products reduced to one-third of total 
production. By 2015, Group plans to produce 40mt of total crude steel output per 
year.     
Tianjin Pipe 
Corporation 
(TPCO) 
Created by Tianjin Municipal Government in 1989 and under 
Municipal Government ownership. Heavily indebted to 
municipality and banks until late 1990s when debt was converted 
to equity. Since 2005 Tianjin Economic & Technological 
Development Area (TEDA) and other state owned entities are 
shareholders but TPCO also benefits from some low interest rate 
loans. 
An integrated steel plant specialising in pipes for the oil and gas sector. In 2005, 
a wider range of products with improved quality and large expansion of 
production of seamless pipes. About 3-fold increase in production between 1997 
and 2005 (1.4mt). Production and sales in 2010 about 2.7 million tonnes valued 
at about RMB17b (adversely affected by US anti-dumping action). Exporting to 
many oil producing countries. Many major international oil companies are 
customers. Profit in 2005 about 5% of sales. Before the US anti-dumping action 
in 2012, profits were in the RMB2b to RMB3b range.   
Note: RMB is Renminbi, Chinese currency. US$1 was approximately RMB6.4 in July 2012.   
Table 2: Case study companies: Background, governance and general information 
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 Capability stages 
Company Stage 1: Manufacturing  Stage 2: Investment Stage 3: Adaptation Stage 4: Innovation 
 
Beijing Benz (JV) 
& BAIC 
 
Very High in JV with Daimler 
AG and in BAIC with 
accumulated experience of 
manufacturing different types of 
vehicles (passenger cars and 
commercial and military 
vehicles).  
Very High in JV. Investment in 
assembly and engine plant in 
collaboration with JV partner. 
High in BAIC with a range of past and 
current investment projects for different 
types of vehicles.  
Not relevant for the JV with foreign 
knowhow. 
High in BAIC – evidence of development 
of vehicles based on acquired technology 
(e.g. military vehicles, models based on 
SAAB designs including electric 
vehicles).  
Not relevant for the JV not engaged in 
innovation. 
Medium to High in BAIC.  
Independent development of military 
vehicle claimed. BAIC has set up an 
electric vehicle subsidiary, R&D base 
and supply chain. Prototypes of “new 
energy” vehicles were shown in 2011.  
 
Tianjin FAW Xiali 
Automobile Co 
 
Very High competence in 
operating established technology 
through experience of 
manufacturing components and 
assembly (2.4 million cars).  
High: Demonstrated by the substantial 
implemented and continuing investment 
programme (assembly and major 
component manufacture). 
High: Demonstrated by competence to 
adapt and develop models based on 
imported technology. Supported by own 
R&D department and that of FAW for 
advanced engine development.  
Medium: Long established R&D 
programme for model design and 
development of small economy cars 
based on established technology.  
 
BYJC Machine 
Tool Co Ltd  
Very High competence in 
operating established technology 
augmented by acquisition of 
Waldrich Coburg and exchanges 
of staff with JV partners. 
High: Managed installation of new 
factory outside Beijing. Other 
investment projects related to 
restructuring continuing.  
High: Product and process adaptation and 
development (assembly lines with JV 
partner), especially super heavy milling 
machines in collaboration with foreign 
subsidiary.   
Medium to High: Company has 5 
pragmatic patents (see note). Prefers not 
to patent important technologies. 
Waldrich Coburg operates 
independently with separate R&D.   
 
Tianjin Metal 
Forming Machine 
Tools General 
Works 
 
Very High competence in 
operating established technology 
and managing suppliers of 
components. Capacity to learn 
quickly when new equipment is 
introduced. 
High: Managed construction of new 
factory. Normal reliance on suppliers 
when new equipment is introduced. 
Most advanced foreign equipment 
installed. 
Very High: Increased the range of 
products and capacity of presses. 
Restructured the business to outsource 
standard components to focus on 
producing key components and assembly. 
Work with customers to design presses to 
meet specific requirements. 
High to Very High: Developed 
specialist presses for aircraft panels, 
glass fibre and nuclear power station 
component, requiring high precision. 
Company owns 540 (80%) of patents in 
the sector (of which 30% are 
“invention” patents – see note). 
 
Shougang Group 
Corporation 
 
Very High competence 
demonstrated by fully 
comprehensive management of 
operations in the old and new and 
recently acquired plants. 
Very High: Management of new plant 
construction. Blast furnaces designed 
and constructed by design and 
engineering subsidiary. Most advanced 
steel rolling mills installed. An 80 tonne 
ladle furnace (to produce purer steel) 
was purchased and then 2 copies made.  
Very High: Since early days, reliance on 
internal development and adaptation of 
technology and purchase of imported 
technology when necessary (Nolan and 
Yeung, 2001). Very high ability to adapt 
and develop processes and products and 
large improvements in environmental 
protection. 
High to Very High level of research 
competence and a continuing 
programme of internal and cooperative 
research with universities, research 
institutes and companies. Between 1986 
and 2006, ranked fifth among Chinese 
companies in registering Chinese 
patents.  
 
Tianjin Pipe 
Corporation 
(TPCO) 
 
Very High competence in fully 
integrated steel production and 
pipe manufacture. Increase in 
range of products with limited 
external support and problem 
solving for customers. 
High: Expansion of production 
capacity with normal support from 
equipment suppliers, installation of 
seamless pipe capacity, and 
collaboration with supplier in designing 
new equipment. New 500,000 tonne 
plant being constructed in Texas.   
Very High: Increase in range of products 
for the oil and gas sector and 
diversification into other products (e.g. 
low and high pressure cylinders). 
Designing customised products. Obtained 
international certifications for products.  
High to Very High: Has developed 
own proprietary TP (Tianjin Pipe) 
products. By far the leading Chinese 
innovator with most national 
“invention” patents in the sector. 
Developments since 2006 include high 
grade steel pipes and special pipe 
connectors. Research in new areas 
being undertaken to diversify.     
Note: There are different types of patents in China. An “invention” patent is granted for a new technical solution relating to a product or process. “Utility” or pragmatic product 
development patents are for new shape or structure of a product made to change functionality and not just for aesthetics.  
  
Table 3: Case study companies: Assessment of capability development 
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4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Returning to questions posed at the end of section 2, the progressive relationship between stages holds up 
with the following caveat. Product development can take place without ground breaking innovation and 
could therefore either be subsumed in Stage 3 competence or be added as an additional stage between 
stages 3 and 4. This raises a broader question about the nature of industrial innovation in the latecomer 
context which requires further investigation. On the issue of compatibility between JVs and developing 
internal capabilities, three of our case companies (BAIC, Tianjin FAW Xiali and BYJC) show that these 
are not mutually exclusive. All three demonstrate internal learning and progress in innovation. Arguably, if 
JV subsidiaries contribute substantial profits, as is the case in all three, they are cash cows which may 
finance innovation expenditure. Having said that, these three companies have been categorised lower in 
their attainment of Stages 3 and 4 competences than the other three case companies. Therefore, there is 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the pace of capability development is slower with foreign JV 
participation, though less sharply than demonstrated by Gao (2011). On the third question of 
manufacturing versus innovation competence, according to the sequential capability development model, 
the latter has to be built on Stages 1 to 3 competences and an understanding of the market and valued 
product features derived from these. This appears to be valid for mature sectors but may be less so for 
sectors with short product life cycles or disruptive technologies. 
This paper has provided a summary of the findings from the study. The next stage is to examine the 
capability development processes and the associated accumulation and role of skills in more detail, 
incorporating the nature and relative importance of the 3 Ls (leverage, learning and linkage). To 
complement the 3 Ls of Matthews (2006), we propose 2 Ms, motivation (to reflect what drives SOEs to 
develop capabilities) and money (to represent access to financial resources) - both required for the 
capability development process.      
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